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1 Introduction
THE modern world is awash in synthetic and naturally occurring chemicals deployed
with an intent to improve our quality of life. Nearly  million different chemicals are
currently catalogued, and approximately , new substances are identified every
day. While this ingenuity in manipulating the basic building blocks of matter
accounts for many of the accomplishments of our industrial society, some of those
chemicals may have unanticipated or undesirable consequences for human health
and the environment.
. Public Policies for Addressing Toxics
Toxics originate from highly diverse sources, including a wide variety of manufac-
turing processes that employ hazardous substances. Human beings experience
exposure to toxics in numerous settings, and the ultimate environmental fate of haz-
ardous substances is enormous in its scope. Toxic substances are used in consumer
products, as industrial chemicals, and as pesticides. Hazardous chemicals are found
in waste from manufacturing plants and households, in the workplace, and also may
be transported over long distances through air and water.
Hazardous substances may have effects on human health or on the integrity of
natural ecosystems or both. In addition to their intended uses, chemicals to which
human beings are exposed may present risks of carcinogenicity (cancer), terato-
genicity (birth defects), mutagenicity (genetic mutations), neurotoxicity (nerve
damage), and a wide array of other adverse health effects. Concern for previously
underappreciated health effects such as endocrine (hormone) disruption has
recently increased dramatically.
Poisons such as pesticides purposely released into the environment can have unin-
tended consequences, such as species loss through concentration at higher levels in
the food chain. Pollution or chemical waste discharged into the environment as
by-products of industrial manufacturing processes can disrupt terrestrial and aquatic
ecosystems—some of them of considerable economic importance. Synthetic chem-
icals such as chlorofluorocarbons, which were once thought to be environmentally
benign, can turn out to have near-catastrophic consequences of global proportions,
such as the destruction of the stratospheric ozone layer.
The goals of policy interventions to combat the risks presented by toxic sub-
stances demonstrate a wide variation. Some regulatory approaches are designed to
establish minimum common standards to protect health and the environment from
unacceptable levels of harm. Others are intended to reduce competitive distortions
that arise from divergent policy goals or approaches. Alternatively, public policies
may attempt to create incentives for industry to reduce emissions of toxics or the
use of hazardous substances in manufacturing processes. Finally, public policy may
address toxic risks by leaving them to a system of liability,with harm from toxic expo-
sures being addressed through general principles of compensation rather than
through government regulation.
The range of options in terms of the point of policy intervention is similarly broad.
Public policy may seek to reduce the use or production of toxics in favour of less haz-
ardous substances or processes. Governmental regulation, instead or in addition,
may address the removal of toxics from waste streams that pollute air, water, or soil.
After harm has occurred, public policies establish criteria for determining whether
compensation is appropriate and, if so, in what amount.
Further complicating the complexity of the situation is the vast spectrum of policy
strategies, instruments, and tools for responding to the problems created by toxics.
Governments may require public authorities to evaluate and approve potentially
hazardous substances as a condition for market entry.Alternatively, regulatory inter-
ventions may be required to remedy existing situations in which risks from toxic sub-
stances are present, including the removal of existing products from the market or
establishing conditions of use or disposal.
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. International Dimensions of Regulating Toxics:
Hard and Soft Law
It is increasingly apparent that the environmental and public health hazards pre-
sented by many toxic substances transcend national borders and may even be global
in scope. The form of public policy interventions at the international level is signifi-
cantly different from the regulatory tools typically employed by national govern-
ments. Coordinated multilateral responses often involve binding international
agreements or non-binding, hortatory instruments of a kind different from the regu-
latory tools routinely encountered at the national level. Supranational authorities
such as the European Union (EU), which exercise some but not all of the regulatory
powers ordinarily associated with sovereign states, create additional analytical com-
plexities (→ Chapter  ‘Regional Economic Integration Organizations’). Last, in
recent years, industry self-regulation in the form of private voluntary standards has
attracted increasing attention as a public policy strategy (→ Chapter  ‘Private and
Quasi-Private Standard Setting’).
Sovereign states have the authority to regulate private parties under their jurisdic-
tion (→ Chapter  ‘Changing Role of the State’). On occasion, states may coordinate
or harmonize their policies in binding international agreements. Such an approach
has considerable advantages, including enhancing the environmental efficacy of
individual national responses through coordinated multilateral action; minimizing
distortions in competitiveness that arise from disparate national policies; and pro-
viding a mechanism for holding other states parties to the agreement accountable
through the creation of binding international obligations.
Binding treaties, however, also have drawbacks (→ Chapter  ‘Treaty Making and
Treaty Evolution’). Initiating a multilateral negotiation on a major new treaty or con-
vention typically requires mustering considerable political will. Negotiations on an
international agreement may take many years, and the results may represent a disap-
pointing ‘least common denominator’ result, which is responsive to the needs of the
least, rather than the most, ambitious positions taken in the negotiations. Even then,
an international compact binds only those states that have formally accepted the
obligations in it.
In response to considerations such as these, states and international institutions
have often relied on less formal, non-binding instruments for situations that do
not necessarily require obligations that are enforceable under international law
(→ Chapter  ‘Formality and Informality’). The texts of non-binding instruments,
which have been widely employed in the field of international regulation of toxics,
consequently are typically phrased in terms of ‘shoulds’ rather than the obligatory
‘shalls’ characteristic of binding obligations, which are more frequently found in the
‘hard’ law created by treaties and international agreements. One important function
of this category of ‘soft’ instruments is consciously to establish normative expect-
ations, which often function as standards of good practice.
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In contrast to a ‘hard’ international agreement, a non-binding ‘soft’ instrument
may allow states to gain experience with more ambitious, aspirational goals in a
milieu that is perceived as being less risky. By contrast, under such circumstances
states might commit to binding or ‘hard’ treaty obligations only of a modest charac-
ter, if at all. Alternatively, non-binding instruments may also be appropriate for cir-
cumstances in which consensus is elusive or illusory, while, nonetheless, supporting
more aggressive policy action by those states that are prepared to do so. Non-binding
instruments may be attractive alternatives to a downward spiral towards a least com-
mon denominator—a result characteristic of many multilateral efforts.
A ‘soft’ instrument may be particularly useful for establishing normative, albeit
non-binding, expectations for private parties. To accomplish this goal through a for-
mal treaty negotiation is cumbersome at best. Since non-state actors such as private
industry are not subjects of international law (→ Chapter  ‘Business’), an inter-
national agreement cannot create obligations for private entities except through the
intermediary of states parties to the agreement. Governmental authorities must then
prescribe rules for regulated private entities within their jurisdiction. A non-binding
instrument can bypass this unwieldy and time-consuming structure with exhort-
ations addressed directly to private parties, presumably for implementation on a vol-
untary basis.On occasion, soft law can coalesce into binding customary law,although
this is by no means necessary to ensure the efficacy of a non-binding instrument.
The concept of ‘principles’ is of particular importance in modern international
environmental law. Although they have an analytical significance beyond any one
international instrument, many of these principles are collected and codified in the
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development from the UN Conference on
Environment and Development. Unlike some other non-binding authorities, prin-
ciples of international environmental law are not primarily intended expressly to
establish normative standards. Rather, these principles are overarching aspirational
precepts identified as part of a comprehensive and unifying architecture that identi-
fies the direction in which international law should progressively evolve.Principles of
international environmental law consequently are equally relevant to the develop-
ment of treaties, customary law, and non-binding norms. Among the more salient
principles in the field of toxics regulation are the exhortation to engage in precau-
tionary decision-making (Principle  of the Rio Declaration) and the polluter pays
principle (Principle  of the Rio Declaration).
This chapter analyzes the enormous scope of international instruments address-
ing hazardous substances and activities by segmenting strategies for regulating toxic
substances into a typology of specific junctures and regulatory theories that have
been or might be employed to inform governmental interventions, whether at the
national or international level. This approach offers a template for organizing and
categorizing public policy responses to discrete aspects of the problem of controlling
risks from toxic substances. Accordingly, this chapter begins by addressing policies
designed to identify hazardous substances through testing and then progresses to
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treat more substantive public policy interventions designed to reduce or eliminate
risks to public health and the environment from toxics.¹
International law governing toxic substances and activities inevitably evolves
in tandem with policy, legislation, and regulation at the national and (in the case
of the EU) supranational level—strategies that serve as a backdrop against which
multilateral efforts are negotiated and coordinated. For this reason, many multila-
teral instruments in the area of toxic substances and processes are designed to harmo-
nize or extend diverse and sometimes divergent domestic regulatory approaches.
Consequently, the topics below are framed by a brief discussion of domestic
approaches in countries such as the United States or at the supranational level
within the EU, both of which have been at the forefront of identifying public policy
strategies for addressing this complex challenge. The examples, both international
and domestic, have been chosen to illustrate various theories of regulation and do
not aim to be comprehensive. Many national and international approaches, more-
over, represent an amalgam of two or more public policy approaches and cannot
necessarily be strictly compartmentalized.
2 Hazard Identification and
Testing
One of the first questions inevitably encountered in crafting public policies for toxic
substances, and a logical starting place for discussion, is that of identification and
definition. Among the universe of elements and compounds encountered in the
world, and especially those that are synthetically manufactured, some raise concern
about adverse effects on human health or to the environment, while others present
less cause for alarm or none at all. The level of risk that justifies a policy intervention
is largely a social policy determination involving the application of judgment and
values. Nonetheless, in making the distinction between ‘toxic’ or ‘hazardous’² chem-
icals that warrant policy interventions and the remainder that do not, it is essential to
have basic empirical toxicity data.
Of the tens of millions of different chemical substances known, about , are
utilized in industrial processes. Of those, very few have been thoroughly tested for
human toxicity or adverse environmental impacts. National legislation in the United
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¹ Certain aspects of toxic substance regulation are addressed in other chapters, such as liability and
cleanup (→ Chapter  ‘International Responsibility and Liability’) and private voluntary approaches
(→ Chapter  ‘Private and Quasi-Private Standard Setting’ and Chapter  ‘Business’).
² For the purposes of this chapter, the terms ‘toxic’and ‘hazardous’are used interchangeably in a non-
technical sense to identify situations characterized by a heightened risk of injury, disease, or death from
exposure to synthetic or extractive chemicals or substances.
States addresses the need for testing of existing chemicals and screening of new
substances.³ The Commission has formally proposed new legislation to the Council
and the European Parliament consisting of a comprehensive new regulatory frame-
work for registration, evaluation, and authorization of chemicals (REACH), which
would systematize and strengthen chemical regulation by requiring the registration
of existing and new chemicals.⁴ As of this writing, a first reading of the proposal had
been completed in both the Council and the Parliament, and formal adoption of the
new system is expected by the end of . The proposed registration process would
require the production of basic toxicological data, including studies of ecotoxicity, if
they are not already available.
. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) Harmonization Initiatives
Coordinating national test protocol and data requirements at the international level
has significant benefits,particularly by reducing redundant or contradictory require-
ments from one country to another. Similarly, divergent national testing require-
ments can have unintended adverse consequences that can impede trade. Based on
these considerations, the OECD has been actively involved for several decades in
harmonizing national policies for testing chemicals.
Since , a ‘screening information data set’ program set out in a Decision-
Recommendation on the Co-operative Investigation and Risk Reduction of Existing
Chemicals has operated under the auspices of the OECD to develop basic informa-
tion concerning about  poorly characterized international high production vol-
ume chemicals.⁵ The base set of data includes the results of tests for physico-chemical
properties, environmental fate, environmental effects, and health effects. As with
other testing programs, the principal goal is to assure adequate characterization of a
substance to determine appropriate substantive regulatory policy for that chemical.
Since the s, the OECD has also had a program to encourage the mutual recogni-
tion of test data by OECD member states—an initiative that has now extended to
non-members as well.⁶
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³ Toxic Substances Control Act,  U.S.C., secs. –.
⁴ See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Concerning the
Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), Establishing a
European Chemicals Agency and Amending EC Directive / and Regulation (EC); and Proposal for
a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending EEC Directive / in Order to
Adapt It to Regulation (EC) of the European Parliament and of the Council Concerning the
Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals, Doc. COM() final.
⁵ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Doc. C().
⁶ See Decision Concerning the Mutual Acceptance of Data in the Assessment of Chemicals, OECD
Doc. C(), as amended by OECD Doc. C(); Decision-Recommendation on Compliance with
Principles of Good Laboratory Practice, OECD Doc. C(), as amended by OECD Doc. C(); and
The choice of forum for, and form of, multilateral cooperation for exchanging
toxicity testing data is revealing. First, these efforts have taken place within the thirty-
member OECD, which is an international organization that is not part of the UN
system, whose members are generally states with industrialized, market-oriented
economies, and which is generally perceived as representing the interests of wealth-
ier countries. Although developing countries may be invited to participate in OECD
work, as in the case of certain of the OECD’s efforts on the mutual acceptance of data,
the OECD is not broadly representative of the interests of all countries. Second, the
multilateral response has been limited to sharing those data that have been produced
through existing national regulatory approaches in a largely voluntary setting, with
only limited attempts to craft a harmonized system of testing at the international
level. An additional reason for this relatively modest, voluntary approach may well
be concerns over the confidentiality of data.⁷
. Initiatives in the United Nations System
Building on a recommendation in Chapter  of Agenda , the Intergovernmental
Forum on Chemical Safety (IFCS) was established in . The IFCS meets approx-
imately every three years and serves as a setting for communication among more
than  governments, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental
groups—including business, labour, environmental, and scientific organizations—
concerned with chemicals management. The forum identifies priorities for coop-
erative action; recommends coordinated international strategies; facilitates the
development of national regulatory infrastructure; identifies gaps in scientific
knowledge related to chemicals; promotes information exchange and technical
cooperation with respect to chemicals; advises governments with respect to chemical
safety; and promotes cooperation between governments and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs). The  session of the forum (Forum III) adopted the Bahia
Declaration on Chemical Safety, a statement that drew attention to the need for fur-
ther action and established concrete goals for chemicals management in such areas as
hazard assessments, the exchange of information, labelling, harmonized standards,
infrastructure development, and the control of illegal trade.
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Decision Concerning the Adherence of Non-Member Countries to the Council Acts Related to the
Mutual Acceptance of Data in the Assessment of Chemicals, OECD Doc. C().
⁷ The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), a component of the World Health
Organization located in Lyon, France, publishes a series of monographs, now covering more than 
environmental agents, designed to relate exposure to environmental factors to the development of
human cancer. The IARC ranks carcinogenic risks, and its work product may be useful to national and
international authorities in evaluating risks of cancer and formulating public policies to reduce them.
Unlike the OECD, the IARC is primarily a scientific research organization and not a forum for harmon-
izing national policies.
In , also following a recommendation in Agenda , several intergovern-
mental organizations entered into a memorandum of understanding establish-
ing an Inter-Organization Program for the Sound Management of Chemicals
(IOMC). The UN World Health Organization provides secretariat services for the
IOMC’s activities, which include participation by the OECD, the UN Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization, and the United Nations Institute for Training and
Research. The United Nations Development Program and the World Bank partici-
pate as observers. Unlike the OECD’s work on chemicals, the efforts of the IOMC are
potentially global in reach.
The IOMC coordinates the international assessment of chemical risks; the har-
monization of classification and labelling of chemicals; information exchange on
chemicals and chemical risks; the establishment of risk reduction programs; the
strengthening of national capabilities and capacities for the management of chem-
icals; and the prevention of illegal international traffic in toxic and dangerous prod-
ucts. Among other things, the IOMC has facilitated the establishment of a globally
harmonized system for the classification and labelling of chemicals. The IOMC
implemented a voluntary prior informed consent procedure that preceded the
legally binding Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain
Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides (PIC Convention) (section .) and has assisted
countries to develop national implementation plans under the Stockholm
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (Stockholm Convention) (section .).
Building on the IFCS Bahia Declaration and the  Johannesburg Plan of
Implementation at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), the
IOMC organizations and the IFCS have embarked on a strategic approach to inter-
national chemicals management (SAICM), which culminated in an International
Conference on Chemicals Management held in Dubai in February . The outputs
from this meeting include a high-level declaration expressing a commitment to
SAICM by governments, representatives of civil society, and the private sector; an
overarching policy strategy describing governmental expectations from SAICM in
such areas as risk reduction, knowledge and information, governance, capacity
building and technical cooperation, and illegal international traffic; and a global plan
of action containing a menu of ‘work areas and activities’, in the form of voluntary
national and international actions, for implementation of the Strategic Approach.
The meeting also served as a vehicle for achieving the WSSD’s goal of assuring that by
the year  chemicals are produced and used in ways that minimize significant
adverse impacts on the environment and human health.The SAICM will also address
the promotion of national regulatory infrastructure, technology transfer, and
improved chemicals management. An additional benefit is expected to be enhanced
implementation of the major global treaties on chemicals, including the PIC and
Stockholm Conventions.
 david a. wirth
3 Conditions of Production and Use
Public authorities may respond to the risks presented by hazardous substances,
products, or processes by establishing conditions under which these substances or
products may safely be used or hazardous activities conducted in a safe manner.
Alternatively, if some risks are deemed to be acceptable, a governmental regulatory
authority may be charged with setting out allowable conditions of use or operation.
This approach may, but need not necessarily, be employed together with a require-
ment for governmental approval, after a governmental authority has determined that
the product or substance meets a regulatory standard but nonetheless must be used
or deployed under limited circumstances to meet this standard. For instance, condi-
tions of use are contemplated by the EU’s REACH proposal, as well as existing EU and
US chemicals legislation (section ).The EC Directive / on the Control of Major-
Accident Hazards Involving Dangerous Substances (Seveso II Directive) (section )
is likewise an application of this regulatory approach to hazardous activities.
. Stockholm Convention
Beyond the local risks posed by their toxicity, persistent organic chemicals (POPs)
such as polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) are a global threat because they are stable
and, hence, persist in the environment for long periods; because they consequently
end up widely distributed geographically, oftentimes far from the place of manufac-
ture or release; and because they accumulate in the fatty tissue of living organisms
and therefore concentrate at higher levels of the food chain. The  Stockholm
Convention builds on years of work by international NGOs to target a ‘dirty dozen’
list of pesticides and industrial chemicals.
The Stockholm Convention goes farther than prior universal agreements address-
ing international trade in hazardous wastes, industrial chemicals, and pesticides
(section ) by directly limiting the production and release of certain chemicals at the
domestic level, whether these substances are involved in international trade or not.
The Stockholm Convention consequently is an example of harmonizing national
policies on conditions of use, in some cases by eliminating the use of a substance al-
together, at a potentially universal, global level. The Stockholm Convention, which
entered into force in , targets nine chemicals and categories of chemicals for
elimination: the pesticides aldrin, chlordane, dieldrin, endrin, heptachlor, mirex, and
toxaphene and the chemicals hexachlorobenzene and PCBs. The agreement also
strictly limits the use of DDT to control disease-carrying insects and requires
governments to limit unintentional releases of PCBs, hexachlorobenzene, dioxins,
and furans.
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As a dynamic instrument designed to be responsive to the needs of the future as
well as the present, the Stockholm Convention contains a mechanism by which the
parties can apply the stringent conditions of the convention to new substances as the
need arises. This mechanism expressly states that decisions to list new chemicals
should be taken on the basis of a precautionary approach. Many of the original dirty
dozen chemicals had already been banned in major industrialized countries under
domestic law, which explains the widespread support for the treaty. More opposition
is expected to the banning or restriction of new substances under the treaty, which
may impinge upon profitable industries in the developed world.
The Global Environment Facility serves as the funding mechanism under the con-
vention and has financed pilot programs for the development of national implemen-
tation plans for the management of POPs, as required by the convention, by
developing and newly industrialized countries. The convention also includes an
important information-exchange component, including a clearinghouse function
for sharing information provided by governments, intergovernmental organiza-
tions, and NGOs, which complements similar efforts coordinated by the IOMC.
. Multilaterally Agreed Standards for Pesticides and
Other Toxics
Since , the voluntary FAO Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of
Pesticides, which was newly revised in , has been the internationally accepted
standard for labelling, packaging, storage, and disposal, and pesticide management.
Similarly, the OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, originally adopted
in , were subsequently amended to include a section devoted entirely to stand-
ards addressed directly to multinational corporations in the area of the environ-
ment.⁸ Both of these instruments apply not only to potentially toxic materials but
also to operations involving hazardous substances or processes. Each of these efforts,
consistent with its non-binding character, is addressed not only to national govern-
ments but also directly to a variety of public and private actors, including local offi-
cials, industry, workers, consumers, NGOs, and the public generally.
Alternatives to formal treaties may be particularly well suited to certain institu-
tional settings. For example, through the process of negotiating loan agreements
with sovereign states on a case-by-case basis, the World Bank is uniquely positioned
to influence policies in those states, principally developing countries, which borrow
from the bank. The bank’s loan preparation process is governed by a series of instru-
ments known as ‘operational policies’, ‘bank procedures’, and ‘good practices’ in such
areas as pest management and environmental assessment (section .). In principle,
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⁸ OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Paris: OECD, ).
the first two categories are internally binding on bank personnel and the third
advisory, but the force of the instruments may vary depending on their terms.
4 Regulation of Pollutant Releases
Establishing conditions of use, as discussed in the previous section, is a public policy
strategy that can be usefully employed in certain cases to reduce the risk presented by
a hazardous substance or product. Such an approach may be particularly appropri-
ate for reducing workplace risks from toxic substances or to protect those who use
them, such as pesticide applicators or consumers. There may also be concern for
environmental exposures to, for example, a toxic pollutant that may have adverse
consequences for public health or the environment or both. While establishing con-
ditions of use may reduce some risks resulting from exposures to toxic substances,
this approach may not be sufficient to protect the public and the environment from
harmful levels of exposure to pollutants released as by-products of industrial, manu-
facturing, or other activities.
Public policies for limiting exposures to toxic or hazardous materials may be artic-
ulated in a number of ways. One approach is to limit emissions as such—a strategy
that may be expressed in a regulatory sense as an upper bound on acceptable levels of
releases of the substance in question. This may be a particularly attractive option if
policymakers choose to control releases based on available technology, in which case
the emissions limitations may reflect the level of technology chosen, often by refer-
ence to an adjective standard such as ‘best’ technology or ‘maximum’ control. One
drawback to emissions limitations phrased by reference to available technologies is
that it may be difficult to correlate the regulatory standard to real-world exposures.
In other words, if there are enough sources, then even stringent emissions limitations
may still result in unacceptable ambient concentrations of a toxic pollutant.
Another approach is to establish limitations on environmental exposures as such,
a strategy that is typically articulated as an upper limit on ambient concentrations of
the substance in question.While this approach may be more directly linked to expos-
ures, it is also not free of conceptual and practical difficulties. A regulatory autho-
rity must establish an ‘acceptable’ concentration or level of exposure, which may be
politically controversial or scientifically difficult. Ultimately, the ambient exposure
limitation must be implemented by reductions in emissions from sources, necessi-
tating sometimes complicated extrapolations or modeling to correlate source emis-
sions with environmental concentrations. Empirical monitoring, moreover, is
necessary to assure that the regulatory targets in the form of maximum ambient con-
centrations have been achieved.
National and supranational regulatory approaches contain examples of each of these
strategies—emissions limitations and control of ambient concentrations—with both
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often employed simultaneously. For example, United States law and policy for
addressing air pollutants relies on an ambient approach to protecting public health
and the environment from harmful concentrations of most air pollutants, including
at least one toxic substance, lead.⁹ Technology-based controls apply to a list of 
other toxic chemicals pursuant to a statutorily specified schedule. The EU’s air 
pollution legislation reflects a similar range of approaches to emissions limitations.
A framework directive was adopted in  with the goal of controlling ambient envir-
onmental exposures to air pollutants and monitoring their concentrations in the
air.¹⁰ By contrast, a directive adopted in  addressing waste incineration requires
the establishment of emissions limitations for a variety of conventional pollutants as
well as toxics such as heavy metals.¹¹
Likewise, United States policy with respect to water pollution includes both tech-
nology-based emissions limitations for hazardous substances as a primary approach,
with limitations on ambient concentrations of toxic water pollutants as a secondary,
residual strategy.¹² Similarly, under a framework directive in the field of water policy,
the EU requires the attainment of basin-wide water quality objectives.¹³ Pursuant to
an instruction in the framework directive, the EU has established a list of  toxic
chemicals and categories of chemicals for priority consideration, with the goal of
eliminating emissions and discharges of those hazardous substances within twenty
years.¹⁴
. UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) 
Protocols on Air Pollution
The UNECE, whose membership includes all states of both eastern and western
Europe as well as Canada and the United States, has been working for several
decades on questions of air pollution. A Convention on Long-Range Transboundary
Air Pollution (LRTAP Convention) was concluded in  under UNECE auspices
(→ Chapter  ‘Atmosphere and Outer Space’). The LRTAP Convention was one of
the first international environmental agreements to be structured as a ‘framework’
convention, consciously designed to serve as a vehicle for ongoing multilateral
cooperation (→ Chapter  ‘Treaty Making and Treaty Evolution’). The convention
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⁹ Clean Air Act,  U.S.C., secs. –q.
¹⁰ EC Directive / on Ambient Air Quality Assessment and Management, [] O.J. L/.
¹¹ EC Directive / on the Incineration of Waste, [] O.J. L/.
¹² Clean Water Act,  U.S.C., secs. –.
¹³ EC Directive / Establishing a Framework for Community Action in the Field of Water
Policy, [] O.J. L/.
¹⁴ EC Commission Decision / Establishing the List of Priority Substances in the Field of
Water Policy and amending EC Directive /, [] O.J. L/. As of this writing, no specific con-
trol measures for any of these substances have yet been proposed by the Commission.
consequently articulates no more than a general commitment to ‘limit and, as far as
possible, gradually reduce and prevent air pollution.’
Ancillary agreements, or ‘protocols,’ containing substantive regulatory measures
were subsequently appended to the convention. A  Protocol to the LRTAP
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs Protocol) addresses this cat-
egory of toxics in the context of regional air pollution in a manner complementary
to the globally applicable Stockholm Convention (section .). The POPs Protocol,
which governs  POPs—a wider coverage than the Stockholm Convention—elimi-
nates the production and use of some substances, restricts the uses of others, estab-
lishes emissions limitations, and specifies waste management practices.
A second Protocol to the LRTAP Convention on Heavy Metals, which was adopted
in , addresses three toxics: cadmium, lead, and mercury. This instrument relies
primarily on an emissions reduction strategy for achieving its policy goals. The agree-
ment requires parties to it to reduce emissions of those three heavy metals by reference
to a base year—an international regulatory technique frequently encountered in the
regulation of toxics. The instrument also specifies numerical technology-based emis-
sions limitations and target dates for new and existing stationary sources in eleven
enumerated categories. The agreement likewise sets out technology- and process-
based emissions limitations for major industrial categories, including iron and steel,
non-ferrous metals, power generation, road transport, and waste incineration.
. Multilateral Agreements on Land-Based Sources of
Marine Pollution
Part XII of the  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea articulates
obligations for states to regulate pollutant releases on land, including toxics, that may
contaminate the marine environment. In , following a mandate in Chapter  of
Agenda , more than  states participated in drafting the Washington Declaration
on Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities. The declar-
ation launched a new initiative under UNEP auspices, the Global Program of Action
for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities (GPA).
Among the goals of the GPA are the reduction of emissions of such toxic substances
as POPs, radioactive substances, heavy metals, and hydrocarbons including oil.
Both before and after the adoption of the Washington Declaration, regional multi-
lateral agreements addressing the environment in particular marine areas have
been a principal vehicle for addressing environmental hazards from land-based
sources. As of this writing, the UNEP regional seas program, initiated in  as a
result of the  Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, covers thir-
teen geographic regions. Ancillary protocols on land-based sources of marine pollu-
tion (LBS protocols) have been adopted under the auspices of many of these regional
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seas conventions, including those for the Mediterranean, the southeast Pacific, the
Persian Gulf (ROPME Sea Area), the Black Sea, and the wider Caribbean. The post-
 protocols, including those for the Mediterranean and the wider Caribbean—
neither of which is in force as of this writing—have adopted a comprehensive
basin-wide approach to sources of water pollution, including toxics, that may
adversely affect the marine environment. As in the case of the ECE LRTAP regime, to
the extent that the regional LBS protocols govern substances such as POPs, these
agreements are complementary to global regulatory instruments such as the
Stockholm Convention (section .).
In addition to requirements that parties adopt national plans and programs,
the UNEP LBS protocols contain specific regulatory requirements designed to
address land-based pollution. For example, in addition to the toxics enumer-
ated in the GPA, both the Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean
Sea against Pollution from Land-Based Sources and Activities and the Protocol
Concerning Pollution from Land-Based Sources and Activities in the Wider
Caribbean Region identify organophosphorous compounds, organotin com-
pounds, cyanides, and fluorides as substances to be addressed under the agree-
ments. Other regional agreements addressing toxic water pollution of onshore
origin that are not part of the UNEP regional seas program include the Convention
for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR
Convention), and the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of
the Baltic Sea Area (Helsinki Convention).
5 Hazardous Processes and 
Industrial Accidents
Several major industrial accidents in the latter part of the twentieth century alerted
governments and the public to the potential not only for hazardous substances but
also for manufacturing processes employing them to present risks to the environ-
ment and public health. In , an industrial installation in the Italian town of
Seveso released a cloud of dioxin, requiring the evacuation of more than  people
and the treatment of several times that many for dioxin poisoning. In , methyl
isocyanate escaped from a US-owned pesticide plant in Bhopal, India, and killed
, people. In , water used to combat a fire in the Sandoz Chemical Company’s
industrial compound near Basel, Switzerland, resulted in the release of mercury
compounds, pesticides, and other agricultural chemicals into the Rhine River, which
transported the pollution downstream to Germany, France, and the Netherlands,
causing a massive fish die-off.
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These events, as well as others less well publicized, have focused attention on
manufacturing processes as a potential juncture for regulation. One obvious goal of
regulatory interventions in this area is to reduce the risks of accidents such as those
at Seveso and Bhopal. Addressing manufacturing processes also provides another,
perhaps less apparent, opportunity to encourage shifts towards less polluting, more
sustainable manufacturing practices. As illustrated by the Bhopal catastrophe, which
involved foreign investment, and the Sandoz spill, a case of transboundary pollution,
there is also an important international dimension to this issue.
The EEC Directive / on the Major-Accident Hazards of Certain Industrial
Activities, the first and most influential instrument in the field, was adopted in ,
amended after the Bhopal and Sandoz incidents, and overhauled and replaced by a
new directive (Seveso II Directive) in .¹⁵ The Seveso II Directive addresses not
only hazardous substances in industrial installations, including the storage of toxic
chemicals, but also hazardous processes themselves. Under the directive, operators of
industrial establishments governed by the instrument must notify the competent
national authority and establish a major accident prevention policy. Operators at the
most rigorous regulatory tier in addition must file a safety report, a safety manage-
ment system, and an emergency plan. Unlike in the EU, no single instrument in the
United States governs emergency preparedness and chemical accidents. Federal
legislation nonetheless requires that public authorities, including state and local
governments, must craft an emergency response plan, review it at least annually, and
inform the public about chemicals in the community. Industrial installations must
adopt a facility-specific risk management program and notify public authorities of
emergency releases of any of  extremely hazardous substances.¹⁶
. ECE Convention on the Transboundary Effects of
Industrial Accidents
The Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, negotiated
and adopted in  under the auspices of the ECE, is a multilateral effort along the
lines of the Seveso Directives but addressed more generally to Europe and North
America. Like the Seveso Directives, the convention, which entered into force in
, aims at protecting public health and the environment by reducing the likeli-
hood of such events, along with measures designed to mitigate the effects of those
that do occur. The convention promotes international cooperation among the par-
ties to it before, during, and after an industrial accident.
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¹⁵ EC Directive / on the Control of Major-Accident Hazards, [] O.J. L/.
¹⁶ Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of ,  U.S.C., secs. –; and
Clean Air Act,  U.S.C., sec. (r) and sec. (r).
The convention obliges parties first to identify hazardous operations within their
borders that could have transboundary effects in the event of an accident.After iden-
tification, parties must inform the other parties that could be affected and consult
with them. The convention directs that new installations be sited in areas where the
risks are minimized, and that potential transboundary effects be disclosed and
analyzed in advance. In the area of preparedness, hazardous operations must have
both on-site and off-site contingency plans. In situations in which several parties to
the convention might be affected by a hazardous operation, the convention specifies
that they work together. The convention additionally articulates standards for
informing and consulting with the public, including administrative and judicial
remedies.
In the event of an accident, the convention requires early notification to other
parties and calls on the parties to establish special notification systems for this
purpose, the UNECE Industrial Accident Notification System. Additionally, parties
must take action to minimize transboundary effects, in cooperation with other
parties to the extent required by the situation. Each party to the convention must
designate a competent authority as a focal point for communication and action with
respect to the convention’s obligations.¹⁷
. Multilaterally Agreed Good Practice Standards for
Industrial Accidents
As in other areas covered by this chapter, industrial accidents have been addressed
through non-binding approaches, and other indirect leverage points in the inter-
national system. The OECD Working Group on Chemical Accidents has adopted
Guiding Principles for Chemical Accident Prevention, Preparedness, and Response.¹⁸
The principles address planning, construction, management, operation, and review
of the safety performance of industrial installations employing hazardous processes.
The guidelines, consistent with their non-binding character, are not confined to the
role of national governments but instead are addressed directly to public authorities,
industry, employees, NGOs, and the public generally.
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (section .) specify that
private entities addressed by that instrument should maintain contingency plans to
prevent and control accidents and emergencies; should report accidents immediately
to public authorities; and should educate workers in the proper handling of
hazardous materials so as to avoid accidents. A companion Guidance on Safety
Performance Indicators is intended to help facilities engaged in hazardous activities,
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¹⁷ International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention no.  on the Prevention of Major
Industrial Accidents adopts an analogous approach at the global level.
¹⁸ OECD, Guiding Principles for Chemical Accident Prevention, Preparedness, and Response (Paris:
OECD, ).
governmental authorities, and the local public assess the efficacy of efforts to reduce
the risk of industrial accidents and their effects should an incident nonetheless occur.¹⁹
Development assistance administered through the World Bank or bilateral aid
agencies, and external financing of private projects through sources such as the
World Bank’s International Finance Corporation, are also occasions to influence
public policy and private behaviour in the area of industrial accidents. The World
Bank’s  Pollution Prevention and Abatement Handbook emphasizes opportunities
for investment in less-polluting technologies and processes and sound management
techniques in key mining and manufacturing sectors such as pesticide production
and oil and gas development. Additionally, the handbook, which is intended to be
applied in connection with the bank’s environmental assessment policy (section .),
specifies the need for contingency plans to minimize accidental releases and emer-
gency response procedures to manage accidents when they occur.
6 International Trade in Hazardous
Substances, Products, and Waste
All of the regulatory strategies identified so far can be, and have been, applied within
national jurisdictions and by the supranational EU to intervene in what otherwise
would be unregulated markets. At the national and supranational level, those regu-
latory interventions typically involve imposing obligations on private parties such
as businesses and industries that produce products or engage in activities that may,
at least under some circumstances, pose unacceptable risks to public health or the
environment.
In the international arena, analogous interventions that make use of governmen-
tal regulatory authorities or national police powers may not be possible. In a world of
co-equal sovereign states whose governmental powers are generally limited by the
extent of each country’s territorial jurisdiction, it may be difficult or impossible for
structural or legal reasons for governments to take action to abate risks that emanate
from abroad. Multilateral cooperation of necessity tends to rely on consent and con-
sensus, which may be difficult or impossible to secure so as to respond to risks from
hazardous substances or activities that have a transnational dimension, leading gov-
ernments and non-state actors alike to look to unilateral self-help as an alternative to
concerted international action.
Internationally, the point at which something—a bulk shipment of a substance, a
finished product, a service, capital, or know-how—crosses a national border conse-
quently assumes commensurately greater importance as a potential juncture at
hazardous substances and activities 
¹⁹ OECD, Guidance on Safety Performance Indicators (Paris: OECD, ).
which regulatory requirements designed to reduce risks from toxics might be
applied. Transboundary movements of hazardous substances such as industrial
chemicals, pesticides, or toxic waste may also themselves present risks. For reasons
such as these, the regulation of transboundary trade in hazardous substances has
received considerable attention on the international level. There has also been a great
deal of interest in the relationship between the agreements discussed in this section,
which regulate trade in discrete categories of toxic substances through prescrip-
tive governmental action, and the negative disciplines contained in free trade agree-
ments such as World Trade Organization rules (→ Chapter  ‘Relationship between
International Environmental Law and Other Branches of International Law’).
International trade in hazardous substances and products also raises significant
North-South issues.After banning or severely restricting substances to protect health
and the environment within their territories, industrialized countries have in some
cases continued to allow those same substances to be exported. Developing countries
in response have objected to a ‘double standard’ in which private enterprises in the
industrialized world may profit at the expense of poorer countries, which may not
have the technical capacity, the resources, or the governmental infrastructure to con-
trol the entry of these substances into their territory or to regulate their domestic
use. Multilateral treatment of trade in hazardous substances consequently has been
a vehicle for addressing the broader needs of developing countries in such areas
as regulatory infrastructure, capacity building, technical cooperation, and develop-
ment assistance. Negotiations on these instruments have also been permeated by
delicate considerations of equity and morality.
. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal
(Basel Convention) and the Convention on the Ban of the
Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary
Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within
Africa (Bamako Convention)
The Basel Convention, which was adopted in  and entered into force in , was
the first potentially universal, binding instrument addressing international trade in
wastes, including both hazardous wastes and municipal trash. With respect to states
not party to this instrument, the convention establishes a ‘limited ban’. Specifically,
the Basel Convention prohibits exportation from parties to non-parties and limits
transboundary movements of wastes, both imports and exports, only to those states
that are parties to the convention unless a party has entered into a bilateral agreement
on waste shipments that satisfies Article  of the convention (section .).
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Among parties to the agreement, the core regulatory approach of the Basel
Convention is the establishment of a ‘prior informed consent’ (PIC) regime.
Accordingly, every state party to the convention may choose to ban the importation
of hazardous or other wastes.With respect to other states party to the convention that
have not prohibited waste imports, the government of the country of export must
assure prior notification to the governments of the receiving state and any transit
states in advance of a waste shipment. The shipment may not commence until the
government of the proposed state of import has given its consent in writing.Based on
the written consent of relevant states of import, states of export may allow exporters
to use a ‘general’ notification procedure for up to one year for multiple shipments of
the same types of wastes.
The third Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention, which was held in
Geneva in September , adopted an amendment to the agreement intended to ban
North-South shipments of hazardous waste intended for disposal, as defined roughly
along OECD–non-OECD lines, among parties to the amendment. The amendment
also phases out shipments of hazardous wastes from the same group of primarily
OECD countries intended for recovery or recycling to other states outside this group.
The adoption of the North-South ban amendment, which has been criticized in
some quarters as paternalistic and environmentally counterproductive, is indicative
of substantial continued concern about the environmental integrity of shipments
from developed to developing countries.
Even before the Basel Convention was adopted, there were pressures to strengthen
the rigour and intensity with which this instrument controls international trade in
wastes. African states expressed concern over the Basel Convention’s failure fully to
ban transboundary movements of hazardous and other wastes, and no sub-Saharan
African country signed the convention at the time of its adoption. Under the auspices
of the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union), those countries in
 adopted a stronger regional agreement, the Bamako Convention. The Bamako
Convention bans imports of hazardous waste into Africa and creates a PIC procedure
for trade within Africa.²⁰
. PIC Convention
Like the Basel Convention, the PIC Convention, which was concluded in  and
entered into force in , establishes a legally binding regime for applying PIC
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²⁰ Other regional agreements include the  Izmir Protocol to the Barcelona Convention for the
Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution (section .); the  Waigani Convention to Ban
the Importation into Forum Island Countries of Hazardous and Radioactive Wastes and to Control the
Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within the South Pacific Region; and
the  Central American Regional Agreement on Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes.
principles to international shipments of hazardous chemicals and pesticides. The
PIC Convention applies to goods in the form of chemicals in international com-
merce, in contrast to the Basel Convention, which applies to presumptively harmful
detritus or ‘bads.’ As with the Basel Convention, the principal motivation for the
agreement was to assist developing countries that might have limited regulatory
capacity or difficulty controlling imports to implement their own domestic environ-
mental and public health policies.
The PIC Convention addresses pesticides and industrial chemicals that have been
banned or severely restricted for health or environmental reasons by parties, and
which have been notified by parties for inclusion in the PIC procedure. The agree-
ment requires that any import ban be universal and non-discriminatory. That is, a
party cannot refuse to import a chemical from another party while continuing
to permit domestic production or allowing imports from other parties or from 
non-parties. At the time it was adopted, the convention’s requirements applied to
twenty-two pesticides and five industrial chemicals. The convention also contains
provisions for exchange of information concerning potentially hazardous chem-
icals in international trade, and channels for providing technical assistance to devel-
oping countries to improve their domestic capabilities to manage toxic chemicals
and pesticides.
With respect to the covered substances, the convention requires the formal,
written consent of the government of the state of import before exportation may
take place. In response to a notification from the Convention secretariat, a state of
import that is a party to the convention may decide to allow importation of the
chemical, to prohibit importation, or to allow importation subject to specified
conditions. Alternatively, the convention provides that states of import may pro-
vide an interim response. Like the Stockholm Convention (section .), the PIC
Convention contains a mechanism for subsequent additions to the list of covered
substances.
. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (Cartagena Protocol)
The Cartagena Protocol, an ancillary instrument to the  United Nations
Convention on Biological Diversity, was adopted in January  and entered into
force in September . The protocol governs genetically modified food and crops,
which strictly speaking are not toxic substances. Its public policy approach, however,
is similar to those in the Basel and PIC Conventions. The Cartagena Protocol
expressly articulates a public policy of precaution, and the instrument as a whole can
be seen as an embodiment of this approach.
The principal regulatory vehicle in the protocol is the requirement for ‘advanced
informed agreement’ (AIA), which is analogous to the PIC requirements established
for hazardous wastes under the Basel Convention and for chemicals and pesticides in
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the PIC Convention. The protocol requires as a first step in the AIA process advance
notice to the state of import before the first exportation of a living modified
organism (LMO). The state of import then has a right to permit, deny, or impose
conditions on the importation of the LMO in question and must ensure that a
risk assessment has been performed. The other principal substantive aspect of
the Cartagena Protocol concerns the establishment of a biosafety clearinghouse
designed to facilitate the exchange of scientific, technical, environmental, and legal
information on, and experience with, living modified organisms, with particular
attention to the needs of developing countries.
LMOs as defined in the protocol include those intended for release into the envir-
onment, such as seeds, as well as those intended for human food or animal feed, but
does not as a general matter include pharmaceuticals. LMOs intended for direct use
as food or feed are not covered by the AIA procedure. As to LMOs intended for food,
feed, or processing, the biosafety clearinghouse must be notified within fifteen days
of a decision regarding domestic use, including domestic marketing with a potential
for exportation.
7 Disposal of Toxic Waste
The lifecycle of a hazardous substance may result in release into the environment,
typically to the media of air or water, at which juncture regulatory requirements,
typically in the form of emissions limitations, may apply (section ). Alternatively,
a particular toxic substance may ultimately find its way into industrial waste as a
component of the detritus remaining at the conclusion of a manufacturing
process. Similarly, household or consumer products consisting of or containing
hazardous materials may enter the waste stream. As with releases of toxics to the
environment, the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste presents
risks to public health and the environment that have been addressed by regulatory
policies.
In the United States, statutory requirements establish minimum technical and
scientific standards for hazardous waste.²¹ For instance, hazardous waste landfills
must have double liners, leachate collection systems, and groundwater monitoring
facilities. The principal mechanism for implementing the statute is a requirement
that existing and new facilities obtain a federal operating permit. The statute also
establishes the so-called ‘cradle-to-grave’ manifest or tracking system to ensure that
waste ultimately arrives at a permitted facility. EU legislation is similar in establish-
ing technical requirements for waste and its treatment with the goal of reducing
hazardous substances and activities 
²¹ Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of ,  U.S.C., secs. –k.
adverse impacts on public health and the environment.²² The legislation identifies a
variety of categories of waste—municipal waste, hazardous waste, non-hazardous
waste, and inert waste—and specifies requirements for landfills that may accept each
category. Like the US legislation, the directive sets up a system of operating permits
for landfill sites.
The binding obligations contained in the Basel Convention (sections . and .)
address the ultimate fate of waste governed by the agreement as part of its strategy
of regulating trade in this hazardous commodity. Other international regimes
target disposal more directly by attempting to harmonize national regulatory
approaches.
. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution
by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter
(London Convention)
The London Convention, for which the International Maritime Organization serves
as Secretariat, is a multilateral agreement of potentially global scope designed to
address one component of the disposal problem, namely dumping at sea (→ Chapter
 ‘Ocean and Freshwater Resources’). The London Convention, like a number of
regional agreements adopted after it, adopts a listing approach.A ‘black list’ identifies
substances, including compounds containing the toxic heavy metals mercury and
cadmium, and organohalogen pesticides, whose dumping is prohibited altogether.A
second ‘grey list’ includes substances such as wastes containing other heavy metals,
which require a special permit in advance. Since its adoption in , the London
Convention has been amended several times, most notably to ban ocean incineration
of wastes and the disposal at sea of low-level radioactive waste.
The Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping of Wastes and other Matter,which entered into force in March , super-
sedes the  instrument for parties to both agreements. The protocol is based on a
precautionary theory of regulation expressly articulated in the text and consequently
is much more restrictive than the earlier instrument. To this end, the protocol, in a
regulatory approach that is in direct contrast to the  London Convention, pro-
hibits ocean dumping altogether unless the activity is specifically authorized by the
new agreement. Among the very restricted categories of waste for which ocean dis-
posal is allowed are dredged material; sewage sludge; waste from fishing operations;
vessels, platforms, and other man-made structures; inert, inorganic geological mater-
ial; and organic material of natural origin. The protocol also prohibits ocean inciner-
ation and the exportation of wastes to other states for dumping at sea.
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²² EC Directive / on the Landfill of Waste, [] O.J. L/.
. International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA)
Agreements and Standards
Nuclear safety, along with technology transfer and verification, is one of the three
pillars of the IAEA’s program.After the Chernobyl accident, four binding multilateral
agreements in the area of nuclear safety were adopted under IAEA auspices. One of
these agreements, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and
on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (Joint Convention), which was
adopted in  and entered into force , is the first binding international agree-
ment to address the management and storage of radioactive waste and spent fuel in
countries that do and do not have nuclear programs. The Joint Convention builds on
the earlier IAEA Principles of Radioactive Waste Management,which were published
in .
The goal of the Joint Convention is to assure that individuals, society, and the
environment are adequately protected against radiological hazards. The convention
requires states parties to establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory frame-
work to govern the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management through
a system of licensing of facilities by a national regulatory body. The agreement
sets out standards for the siting, design, construction, operation, closure, and safety
assessment of spent fuel management and radioactive waste management facilities.
Both existing and proposed facilities are covered by the Joint Convention, which
also articulates general requirements for safe operation. Additionally, the Joint
Convention sets out a regime of notification and consent for transboundary move-
ments of radioactive waste based on the  IAEA Code of Practice on the
International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste.
Other IAEA agreements are also designed to further the goal of nuclear safety. The
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on
Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency are intended to
facilitate international preparedness for, and responses to, nuclear and radiological
emergencies. The Convention on Nuclear Safety obliges states parties to operate
nuclear power plants in a manner consistent with high standards of safety. The
Convention on Nuclear Safety requires each party to develop and enforce safety stand-
ards, but it does not itself prescribe the standards. Consequently, there is no inter-
nationally binding instrument that sets minimum safety standards for nuclear reactors.
The IAEA has also adopted hundreds of safety standards, which are not binding on
IAEA member countries, intended in part to serve as models of good practice for
states in crafting their own legislation and regulations.These safety standards are fur-
ther categorized as fundamental principles, mandatory requirements, and recom-
mended guidance. Published IAEA standards in the area of radioactive waste
management include those addressing the classification of radioactive waste, the pre-
disposal management of radioactive waste,and the management of radioactive waste
from medicine, industry, research, agriculture, and education.
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8 Integrated Approaches to 
Pollution Prevention
As a result of the difficulty of managing hazardous substances and products once
they have been produced, attention in recent years has shifted to a more comprehen-
sive approach that focuses on minimizing the likelihood of adverse effects for the
environment and public health—‘pollution prevention’. In the area of hazardous
substances and products, the emphasis has been on minimizing the need for toxic
substances either in manufacturing processes or finished products—‘toxics use
reduction’.
For example, legislation adopted by Massachusetts, a subnational unit in the
United States, is an effort at implementing precautionary perspectives underlying a
toxics use reduction approach.²³ The statute does not regulate based on risk or ‘safe’
levels of exposure or emission but, instead, encourages reductions in the use of about
, enumerated industrial chemicals by setting out specific, numerical reduction
targets by comparison with a reference baseline. The EU’s volatile organic chemicals
(VOC) solvents directives adopt a similar approach by permitting Member States to
adopt use reduction plans as an alternative to command-and-control end-of-pipe
emissions limitations.²⁴
. Basel Convention
Few binding international agreements address pollution prevention as a regulatory
tool, presumably because the approach is still crystallizing as a public policy option
at the domestic level. One exception is the Basel Convention (section .), whose
overall strategy is to limit the transboundary shipments of wastes. Accordingly, the
convention encourages the generation of wastes to be reduced to a minimum—a
requirement that can be seen as a particularized expression of the precautionary and
polluter-pays principles. In part to reduce the need for international shipments of
wastes, parties to the convention are to assure the availability of facilities for sound
management of wastes within their territories. Wastes may be exported only under
certain conditions, including the unavailability of suitable disposal facilities in the
country of generation and the need for wastes as a raw material for recycling or recov-
ery operations in the state of import.
Other provisions of the Basel Convention indirectly encourage waste reduction.
Notwithstanding the consent of the proposed state of import, the convention
requires that states of export prohibit shipments of hazardous and other wastes if
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there is reason to believe that the wastes will not be managed in an environmentally
sound manner in the country of import. The convention also articulates an obliga-
tion for states of export to ensure that international shipments of wastes are accepted
for re-import if those shipments do not conform to the terms of export. Article  of
the Basel Convention specifies that the requirements of the convention will not apply
to transboundary movements between parties and non-parties that are governed by
bilateral or regional arrangements that meet certain standards. In particular, Article
 agreements concluded after the entry into force of the Basel Convention must con-
tain provisions that are ‘not less environmentally sound’ than those in the convention.
. OECD Recommendation on Pollution Prevention
The OECD in  adopted a non-binding recommendation on integrated pollution
prevention and control.²⁵ The recommendation contains an appendix entitled
‘Guidance on Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control’, which identifies basic
principles, including the consideration of the entire lifecycle of substances and prod-
ucts; the anticipation of environmental effects in a variety of environmental media,
including consideration of multiple pathways to exposure and movement through
the environment; the minimization of waste; and the application of a precautionary
decision-making approach. The recommendation also identifies the desirability of
zero- or low-waste technology, recycling, and alternative manufacturing strategies
designed to reduce the use of toxic substances. The form of this instrument, a non-
binding recommendation adopted by wealthier industrialized countries, is perhaps
indicative of the emerging nature of pollution prevention as a regulatory strategy on
the international level.
9 Other Related Policies
Several fundamental approaches of international environmental law of a more
procedural nature may also come into play in addressing public policies related to
hazardous substances or processes.While not confined to situations involving toxics,
these regulatory approaches have particular utility in this area.
. Right to Know
One public policy approach to reducing risks from hazardous substances and activ-
ities is to inform the public of releases of potentially toxic substances, of the presence
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of potentially dangerous activities, or of the nature or magnitude of associated risks.
Public information approaches can complement other substantive regulatory
approaches, such as those related to industrial accidents (section ). Provision of
information can also comprise a complete public policy in itself, which is designed to
allow consumers, workers, and members of the public to make informed choices
about the risks associated with the products they purchase, the quality of the envir-
onment where they live, and potential hazards in the workplace.
As suggested by the catchphrase ‘knowledge is power’, information about the
nature of the local environment can catalyze community activism to address appro-
priate responses to toxic hazards by holding local businesses and municipal govern-
ments accountable. Indeed, the anticipated release of potentially anxiety-provoking
information may encourage those who have control over the situation, such as pol-
luting industries, voluntarily to reduce risks or even to incorporate risk-reduction
strategies into their ordinary business plans. Last, information disclosure is among
the least intrusive forms of governmental intervention. In certain situations in which
proposals for substantive prescriptive regulation may encounter political oppos-
ition, labelling and public reporting may be an effective alternative that can be
expected to achieve similar or identical results.
The ECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention), which
was adopted in , articulates an express link between governmental provision of
information to the public and environmental protection (→ Chapter  ‘Public
Participation). To this extent, the Aarhus Convention addresses principles of demo-
cratic accountability and good government more generally. The convention, which
entered into force in , creates rights to information on the part of the public and
obligations for public authorities regarding access to this information. An extraor-
dinary meeting of the parties held in Kiev, Ukraine in  adopted a Protocol on
Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers—an approach employed at the domestic
level involving the collection and dissemination of toxic emissions released into the
environment.
. Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
EIA is a component of a planning process by which environmental considerations
are integrated into decision-making procedures for activities that may have adverse
environmental effects. The emphasis in EIA is on the collection and analysis of
information relating to the environmental consequences of a proposed action. EIA is
a process-oriented analytical technique distinct from substantive environmental
standards and requirements. The principal purpose of EIA is to facilitate informed
decision-making through a thorough scrutiny of anticipated environmental effects.
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With the assistance of this analysis, an informed decision-maker should be able to
assess the advisability of proceeding with proposed actions and to modify proposals
to eliminate or mitigate their adverse environmental effects.
While not confined to the field of toxics, EIA is useful for identifying and analyz-
ing potential adverse effects from hazardous substances and activities. An EIA would
be expected to project the likely and potential effects of toxic substances or danger-
ous activities on the environment and public health.Application of the EIA method-
ology would likely provide an opportunity to consider less hazardous or
environmentally preferable alternatives to the proposed action. The EIA would also
be expected to consider mitigating measures to reduce risks from hazardous sub-
stances and activities and contingency plans in the event of a mishap.
A wide variety of international instruments encourage or mandate the applica-
tion of the EIA methodology at the national level by reference to internationally
harmonized criteria, to cases of actual or potential pollution of the territory of
other states or of areas beyond national jurisdiction, and in the development assis-
tance projects, policies, and programs. Any or all of these instruments could apply
to a hazardous substance or process. Some agreements, such as the  ECE
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context
(Espoo Convention), apply to EIA as such. Others, like the IAEA Joint Convention
(section .) employ EIA as a procedural tool to achieve public policy purposes
related to the substantive goals of the agreement.
10 Conclusion
There is at present no single, overarching international institutional framework for
addressing environmental and public health risks from hazardous substances and
activities. Public policy has been implemented at the national, supranational,
regional, and global levels, sometimes simultaneously, with considerable interaction
among various settings. Like-minded countries, such as members of the OECD, may
coordinate policies among themselves, or a universal strategy such as that found in
the Stockholm Convention may be adopted. International instruments, as in the case
of the Basel and PIC Conventions, may be consciously targeted to address North-
South issues.
In almost every situation, there are also choices to be made between non-binding
‘soft’ instruments and binding international agreements, with advantages and draw-
backs accompanying either choice of the form of instrument. And this is before even
contemplating the variety of regulatory tools available to address a particular prob-
lem, ranging from modest requirements, such as access to information, to bans on
particular substances or rigorous requirements for governmental approval.
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While the broader picture is far from systematic or neat, this outlook is perhaps all
to the good from the perspective of international policy. The difficulties in effectively
reducing risks from hazardous substances and activities are varied and multifaceted
at the domestic and supranational levels, and the impediments are even more impos-
ing internationally. The wider the array of options, the greater the potential for cre-
atively meeting new challenges. Given the scope of the problem, we can hardly afford
to ignore any realistic options among this exceedingly broad array.
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